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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Two men who devoted untold hours to develop an industry in 
a county economically poor are being sued because the Heber Creeper, 
Inc. business suffered financial loss. Many other people were in-
volved in the business decisions. TPS filed bankruptcy. The plain-
tiff then chose these two defendants as a means to recover some of 
its losses. 
The defendants did not receive profit, assets, financial in-
terest or opportunity for themselves. Both defendants were and are 
stockholders of Heber Creeper, Inc., and it was to their interests 
for Heber Creeper, Inc. to succeed. 
Defendant Mendenhall is a cosigner and is personally liable on 
one of the SBA Notes owed by Heber Creeper, Inc. (TR 529, L 14-25). 
Defendants were loyal to their trust. There is not a single act 
of omission or comission that was detrimental to Heber Creeper, Inc. 
interests. The record is clear that both defendants supported pay-
ment of food concession money to Heber Creeper, Inc. The defendants 
were not guarantors of TPS1 obligations or of Heber Creeper, Inc.fs 
financial success. 
The scrap metal or junk piles, and the Harriman Car renovation 
were not the act, responsibility, or liability of the defendants. 
The managing director of Heber Creeper, Inc. actually removed some 
of the scrap metal. However, Heber Creeper, Inc. would hold these 
defendants responsible for the disappearance. 
The plaintiff failed completely to get the issue of purchase and 
debt retirement (Option Agreement) before the trial court. It can-
not be an issue here. 
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The trial court erred in finding from the evidence that the 
defendants violated any fiduciary duty. The law is clear there is 
no duty when the relationship has been terminated and business secrets 
are not involved. 
A R G U M E N T 
POINT I 
CONDUCT OF DEFENDANTS CONFORMED TO THE STANDARD OF 
CARE AND LOYALTY REQUIRED OF CORPORATE OFFICERS. 
Both defendants recognize that duty of care and loyalty exists 
between a corporation and its officers and this court has so held 
many times. 
Cases cited in respondent's brief on duty of care and loyalty all 
concern cases where officers or directors at the time the alleged 
breach occurred, were still officers or directors of the corporations. 
This particularly would not apply to Defendant Mendenhall as he resign-
ed prior to the time the question of payment of food concession money 
arose. 
The breach of fiduciary duty as alleged by Heber Creeper, Inc., 
is based on failure to get results. Defendants were members of a 
board with several other members and did not control the voting. 
The main thrust of Heber Creeper, Inc.fs argument implies that 
the defendants were guarantors of the results wanted by Heber Creeper, 
Inc. Heber Creeper, Inc. is trying to hold the defendants liable 
regardless of whatever efforts defendant mactle. 
It is not a breach of fiduciary duty to belong to two competing 
corporations. Renpak, Inc. v Oppenheimer, 140 So 2d 542 (Fla 1958). 
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In the case now before the court the companies were not true 
competitors and the success of one depended upon the other. Par-
ticularly would this be true of Heber Creeper, Inc. TPS did pay 
two annual payments on the SBA Loan which was an obligation of 
Heber Creeper, Inc. (TR 521, L 3-10 and TR 530, L 7-14). 
It is not a breach of duty, of care or loyalty, if a director is 
unsuccessful in his efforts. Neither defendant received any personal 
gain. Neither defendant took over any Mcorporate opportunity". The 
cases allow officers and directors some latitude in their corporate 
activities. 
In the case of C. G. Caster Company v Regan, 410 NE 2d 422 (111 
1980) the court held, "employee did not breach fiduciary duty as 
officer and director of employing company, even though employee filed 
Articles of Incorporation for a competing business two days after his 
termination by company and company attorney testified that employee 
had told him he was doing things to get fired and that he was preparec 
when firing occurred, so as to indicate that employee was setting up 
a competing business while still employed by company. In light of 
fact that testimony at trial on employment agreement did not demon-
strate that employee was disloyal or that he profited personally at 
company's expense. 
In the Louisiana Case of Marine Forwarding & Shipping Company 
v Barone 154 S 2d 528 (1963), the court held that even if a director 
or president of a corporation resigned, and persuaded a valuable 
employee to leave the corporation and work for him, and he acquired a 
majority of the corporation's customers, the president and director 
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did not violate fiduciary relationship or contractual obligation. 
In the case of Smith v Pacific Pools, Inc., 530 P.2d 658 (Wash 
1975), the court held that the majority stockholders couldn't claim 
that the resigned sales manager breached a fiduciary obligation not 
to compete were the majority shareholder consented to the competition 
despite the fact that the resigned sales manager remained an officer 
and director of the corporation. 
This court held in the case of Microbiological Research Corp. v 
Muna 625 P.2d 690 (1981), that a managing officer did not violate 
his fiduciary duty by not telling the board of directors of a prior 
noncompetition contract and a subsequent contract without a non-
competition agreement was held valid. 
POINT II 
THE ISSUE OF PURCHASING ASSETS AND DEBT 
RETIREMENT (OPTION AGREEMENT) WAS PROPERLY 
REJECTED BY THE COURT. 
The court excluded this issue because the plaintiff attempted to 
raise it for the first time the morning of the trial. Plaintifffs 
counsel in his opening statements stated there would be four issues 
(TR 26). The second issue was the failure to consumate or to see that 
the option to purchase agreement was consumated (TR 30, L 24-25 and 
TR 31, L 1-4). Defendant Mendenhall objected to this issue as having 
been brought up at the last minute. 
Plaintiff contends this was in a proposed pretrial order mailed 
four days before trial by Federal Express, but the same had not been 
received by defendants at the time the trial commenced (TR 42, L 6-
10 and TR 43, L 10-16). 
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The court was correct in excluding this as an issue because it 
was never raised in any pretrial discovery. 
The deposition of Gene Moore, President of Heber Creeper, Inc. 
was ordered published (TR 32, L 23-25). In the deposition the defen-
dants thoroughly explored every issue to be raised by the plaintiff 
and the matter of the Option Agreement was never mentioned. 
In pages 269 to 279 of the pleadings, the plaintiff filed an 
amended response to Mendenhall1s Interrogatories and in summary the 
plaintiff was to list every dispute, breach of duty, occasions when 
Defendant Mendenhall allowed or encouraged certain business opportun-
ities to be taken from TPS, set forth in specific terms each and 
every item'of damage. Never, in any of the answers to ten interroga-
tories, did the plaintiff ever list this issue as one to be litigated. 
The court was correct in refusing to allow the plaintiff to bring up 
in an opening statement an issue involving $246,719 when more than 
two years had gone into trial preparation and discovery. 
Furthermore, the claim of $246,719 was the alleged total value of 
the assets and liabilities being sold. The sum of $116,719 was the 
value of the stock to be purchased. This stock was held by the stock-
holders and was not an asset of Heber Creeper, Inc., (TR 528, L 19-25 
and TR 529, L 1-10) so the plaintiff suffered no loss when the stock 
was not purchased. Since Heber Creeper, Inc. retained all of its 
assets and liabilities, the most for which Defendant Mendenhall could 
be held liable would be the loss of bargin. There was never any 
evidence submitted as to what this might be. The court had to re-
ject this issue and no damages could be awarded. 
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POINT III 
NEITHER DEFENDANT IS LIABLE FOR THE 
DISSIPATION OF THE HEBER CREEPER ASSETS 
The court found by a preponderance of the evidence that neither 
defendant Mendenhall ncr Ritchie were responsible for any alleged 
damage to the Harriman Cars or disappearance of scrap piles, sometimes 
referred to as junk. 
William S. Schultz was a witness for the plaintiff and he testi-
fied he saw tools and scrap iron disappear, but did not know who took 
them (TR 103-304). 
Murl Rollings, another witness for the plaintiff said he was on 
the property one time in 1982 (TR 312). He did not know who caused 
the damages (TR 337). 
By Exhibit 32 plaintiff had attempted to list the damages. Murl 
Rollings testified that most of the damages on the exhibit were paid 
for by the Deer Creek Scenic Railroad and they were not looking for 
reimbursement (TR 337-338). Exhibit 32 was received as to the 
Harriman Coach and the scrap pile only. 
William S. Schultz saw Mendenhall once or twice "up in the depot" 
(TR 104). Schultz was on the premises during April through June of 
1982 (TR 298). 
Dick Buys testified Monte Bona, General Manager of TPS, disposed 
of the piles of scrap iron and Mendenhall did not have anything to do 
with it. 
Monte Bona, General Manager of TPS, testified he was in charge 
of renovating the Harriman cars and fixing them up (TR 645-648). 
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Monte Bona testified that in 1930 Dennis Spendlove, Heber Creeper 
employee, sorted the scrap metal pile after talking with TPS crew 
and maintenance crew, to see what was valuable and then he hauled the 
worthless metal to the junk yard (TR 649). 
Clark Ashton was General Manager of Heber Creeper, Inc. during 
1980-1981. He is also the son of Lowe Ashton who is the chief 
stockholder and for many years President of Heber Creeper. The said 
Clark Ashton hauled some of the trash away himself (TR 650). 
Monte Bona testified that Gordon Mendenhall and Leon Ritchie 
had nothing to do with the removal of the junk or anything to do with 
the Harriman Cars (TR 650-651). 
Monte Bona testified inspections were made of the railroad yards 
and that Gordon Mendenhall and Leon Ritchie never made an inspection 
trip (TR 692). Monte Bona had the seats of the Harriman Cars removed 
and the bad ones were hauled to the junk yard (TR 693). 
Monte Bona tried to register the Harriman coaches with the 
Historical Society but could not do so because there had been too many 
changes made in the cars (TR 695). 
The Harriman Cars were more valuable after their renovation than 
they were before (TR 704). 
The evidence was clearly in favor of no cause of action on this 
issue. 
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CONCLUSION 
The defendants violated no fiduciary duty to the plaintiff and 
caused no harm to the plaintiff. 
Defendants were hard working, civic minded, public servants 
trying to develop a tourist industry for a poor economic county. 
The success of both corporations depended on the Heber Creeper 
Train running. All of their efforts in both corporations were to 
this end. 
This court, from the record, should find the defendants were 
loyal to their trust, caused no damage to the plaintiff, that the 
trial court erred in holding the defendants presonally liable because 
TPS did not pay its food concession obligation to the plaintiff. 
Mendenhall was no longer an officer or director of Heber Creeper, 
Inc. when the claim of the plaintiff for food money arose. Both 
defendants voted for and supported payment to Heber Creeper, Inc. 
Monte Bona, Managing Director for TPS, refused to sign the checks. 
This is the reason payment was not made. It is not and was not the 
obligation of these defendants. J 
RespectfuU-y submitted, 
/^?Harold Call 
^Attorney for Appellants 
And Cross-Respondents 
C*JLP 
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